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INTRODUCTION
In America’s earliest days, punishment for being poor extended
beyond poverty’s unpleasant, concomitant circumstances—nagging
hunger, tattered clothing, vagrancy—to include community-inflicted
sentences such as banishment, whippings, and auctioning off the poor
1
like slaves. American attitudes towards the impoverished may have
transitioned from this uncivilized state of affairs, but resentment
2
towards the poor continues to fester. Free choice, personal
responsibility, and privilege are constant elements in an increasingly
polarized national discourse on the appropriate balance between
3
human compassion and accountability.
In the 1960s, President Lyndon B. Johnson transformed this
debate by launching a national “war on poverty” and insisting that
America provide education and opportunities to citizens of lower
4
socioeconomic status. Expansion of welfare benefits through food
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1. See MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
WELFARE IN AMERICA 10, 20–21 (1986) (describing the degrading treatment the poor often
faced in nineteenth-century America).
2. See infra Part I.B.
3. See infra Part I.B.
4. See Lyndon B. Johnson, Message to Congress on the Economic Opportunity Act
(1964), reprinted in WELFARE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF U.S. POLICY AND POLITICS 224

KENDREX IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

3/12/2015 1:24 PM

122

[Vol. 64:121

DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

stamps and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (“AFDC”) was
a hallmark of the Johnson administration and provided considerable
support to those below the poverty line. In the 1990s, however,
welfare recipients’ alleged abuse of taxpayer dollars sparked a wave
of criticism for the poor and fueled debates in Congress over welfare
reform. By 1996, Congress had eliminated many entitlement
programs, including AFDC, and replaced them with strict work
requirements and time limits on benefits through Temporary
5
Assistance to Needy Families (“TANF”), ostensibly to increase
6
personal responsibility. Although promoting self-sufficiency for ablebodied welfare recipients is a reasonable aim, many scholars contend
that the restrictions actually punish the impoverished more than they
7
provide incentives for advancement, marking a shift in the balance
between decency and personal responsibility.
This tension between compassion and accountability mirrors a
similar balance discussed in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
between enforcing standards of human decency and upholding
legitimate punishment. Eighth Amendment doctrine has transformed
over time to accommodate contemporary standards of human
decency and to prohibit punishment that is offensive to society’s
8
9
values, such as executing minors or the mentally impaired, or
punishing the homeless for squatting in public when they lack
10
adequate shelter. An unanswered question in Eighth Amendment
scholarship is exactly where on these scales the denial of welfare
benefits to the needy falls. This work seeks to fill that analytical void
by analyzing Eighth Amendment doctrine and applying it to the
welfare reform context, where new TANF restrictions penalize
11
certain recipients by revoking benefits upon job loss and imposing

(Gwendolyn Mink & Rickie Solinger eds., 2003) (“The war on poverty is not a struggle simply
to support people, to make them dependent on the generosity of others. It is a struggle to give
people a chance.”).
5. See infra Part I.B.
6. See infra Part I.B.
7. See, e.g., Michele Estrin Gilman, The Return of the Welfare Queen, 22 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 247, 266–75 (2014) (explaining how TANF has punished the poor and
caused significant strife within families that have lost invaluable benefits).
8. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (holding that executing minors violates
the Eighth Amendment).
9. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 521 (2002) (holding that it is a violation of the
Eighth Amendment for states to execute the mentally impaired).
10. See infra Part I.A.
11. See infra Part I.B.
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12

harsh time limits on benefits. In the aggregate, this Comment
contends that overly punitive welfare reforms represent
13
unconstitutional punishment of a “status” rather than an action,
14
offend contemporary notions of human dignity, and may, in fact,
violate the Eighth Amendment.
This Comment will proceed in three parts. Part I will explore
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and its historical underpinnings
and will provide background on the 1996 welfare reforms. Part II will
explore whether welfare reforms penalize individuals for their status
as “poor” or “unemployed” and whether this constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment. Finally, Part III will show how welfare programs
can be reformed for constitutional compliance. Overall, this
Comment aims to show how the Eighth Amendment intersects with
welfare reform and what constitutional limits exist vis-à-vis welfare
restrictions for society’s neediest citizens.
I. SETTING THE STAGE: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON THE
EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND THE 1996 WELFARE REFORMS
American courts continue to analyze the Eighth Amendment in
light of current standards of human dignity. Part A of this Section
explores the evolution of Eighth Amendment doctrine, particularly as
it relates to punishment for status crimes. Part B will examine welfare
reform and its historical justifications to provide a framework for
critically evaluating welfare restrictions in the latter portions of this
piece.
A. Historical Analysis of Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence
15

The Eighth Amendment specifically prohibits state and federal
governments from inflicting cruel and unusual punishments on
16
citizens. Originating in the English Declaration of Rights of 1688,
the Amendment was incorporated into the U.S. Bill of Rights in 1791
12. See infra Part I.B.
13. See infra Part I.A.
14. See infra Part I.A.
15. See Justin F. Marceau, Criminal Law: Un-Incorporating the Bill of Rights: The Tension
Between the Fourteenth Amendment and the Federalism Concerns that Underlie Modern
Criminal Procedure Reforms, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1231, 1287 (2008) (noting that, in
its 1962 decision, Robinson v. California, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment
was selectively incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and applied against the states).
16. “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, § 3.
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17

to outlaw severe punishments offensive to human decency.
Historically, the Amendment was intended to forbid “torture and
other barbarous methods” of punishment—such as disembowelment
18
or decapitation —that were used by states when imposing the death
19
sentence. Early Supreme Court litigation focused on defining the
outer bounds of permissible punishment and determining whether a
20
particular method complied with the Eighth Amendment.
21
When the Court decided Weems v. United States in 1910,
however, it recognized for the first time that proportionality was an
22
important factor in Eighth Amendment analysis. Since this
landmark case, the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment has
come to serve three vital purposes: “it limits [the] kinds of
punishment that can be imposed of those convicted of crimes, it
proscribes punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the
crime, and it imposes substantive limits on what can be made criminal
23
and punished as criminal.” In delineating the boundaries between
constitutional and unconstitutional conduct in this realm, the
Supreme Court relies upon evolving standards of decency, as
24
reflected by society’s customs and values. More recently, the Court
17. See Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and the Substantive Criminal
Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 635, 636–37 (1966) [hereinafter The Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause]. Eighth Amendment doctrine has inevitably shifted over time as the meanings of
morality, decency, and human rights have evolved. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 177 (1803) (declaring that it is the Supreme Court’s duty to “say what the law is”).
18. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, supra note 17, at 637.
19. Jeffrey D. Bukowski, The Eighth Amendment and Original Intent: Applying the
Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishments to Prison Deprivation Cases is Not Beyond
the Bounds of History and Precedent, 99 DICK. L. REV. 419, 422 (1995).
20. Id.
21. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
22. Bukowski, supra note 19, at 423 n.28.
23. Lonnie E. Griffith, Jr., Construction and Application of Eighth Amendment's
Prohibition of Cruel and Unusual Punishment—U.S. Supreme Court Cases, 78 A.L.R. FED. 2d 1,
2 (2013) (summarizing and analyzing cases in which courts have interpreted the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause).
24. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, supra note 17, at 638. Although there is no
precise legal standard for what suffices as “cruel and unusual,” Juliette Smith suggests a
framework for invalidating laws under this Amendment based upon: “(1) the severity of the
punishment and its degradation to human dignity, (2) the probability that the punishment would
be inflicted arbitrarily, (3) substantial rejection of the punishment by contemporary society, and
(4) the availability of a less severe punishment that would serve the same purpose.” See Juliette
Smith, Arresting the Homeless for Sleeping in Public: A Paradigm for Expanding the Robinson
Doctrine, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 293, 309 (1996) (citing to the reasoning in Justice
Brennan’s concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 281–82 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
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has taken judicial notice of international legal standards and jus
cogens in evaluating the interaction of human rights and cruel and
25
excessive punishment.
A series of Supreme Court and lower federal court decisions
pertaining to drug addiction, homelessness, and welfare in the last
fifty years have called into question the state’s ability to punish
26
individuals based on their status. In 1962, in Robinson v. California,
the Supreme Court invalidated a statute that rendered it a crime to be
27
“addicted to the use of narcotics.” According to the Court, the
statute did not punish the act of using drugs, which would have been
28
constitutionally permissible, but it punished the status of being a
drug addict. The Court likened this to punishing someone for being
mentally ill, for being a leper, or even for suffering from a simple
29
cold—all statuses beyond the reach of criminal sanction.
30
A decade later, in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, the
Supreme Court found a Florida vagrancy statute unconstitutional on
the grounds that it was overbroad, did not give residents proper
notice regarding what conduct was impermissible, and placed too
31
much discretion in the hands of police. With this level of discretion,
“the poor and the unpopular [were] permitted to ‘stand on a public
32
sidewalk . . . only at the whim of any police officer.’” Sympathetic to
the needs of the poor, and wary of the involuntary nature of poverty
and homelessness, a federal district court in Florida similarly enjoined
Miami officials from enforcing loitering statutes against the homeless
when such persons engage in harmless conduct because “resisting the
need to eat, sleep, or engage in other life-sustaining activities is
33
impossible.” Arresting or punishing innocent, inoffensive conduct,

25. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–76 (2005) (holding that the Convention
on the Rights of the Child and other human rights treaties and norms are relevant to the inquiry
of whether the death penalty for minors should be prohibited as cruel and unusual in the United
States).
26. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
27. Id. at 660.
28. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 532 (1968) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting
public drunkenness on the grounds that the law banned a specific act rather than a status, and
because the defendant was cited not for being an alcoholic, but for being drunk in public on the
occasion in question).
29. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666–67.
30. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
31. Id. at 165–71.
32. Id. at 170 (quoting Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965)).
33. Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1565 (S.D. Fla. 1992).

KENDREX IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

3/12/2015 1:24 PM

126

[Vol. 64:121

DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

such as sleeping in public when the homeless do not have shelter,
34
violates the Eighth Amendment.
As the above cases demonstrate, the Supreme Court and lower
federal courts since the 1960s have begun to look askance at statutes
that try to punish involuntary statuses or acts directly arising from
poverty. Courts are cognizant of the fact that poverty and
homelessness are usually not the products of free choice, but of
35
unfortunate life circumstances. The Supreme Court has also utilized
other constitutional provisions to invalidate laws that seem to target
36
impoverished individuals. In Shapiro v. Thompson, for example, the
Supreme Court ruled that a one-year waiting period before granting
welfare benefits to someone changing residence from one state to
another unconstitutionally infringed upon the individual’s right to
37
travel and due process protections. The Court also ruled that a
welfare agency may not terminate an individual’s benefits without
first affording the recipient an evidentiary hearing in compliance with
38
the Due Process Clause. Federal courts are often attuned to the
34. Id. In finding the police officers’ conduct in Pottinger v. City of Miami unconstitutional,
the Florida court cited several other federal and state court decisions that had previously found
criminalizing homelessness and its concomitant activities cruel and unusual because
“punish[ing] the unfortunate for this circumstance [homelessness] debases society.” Parker v.
Mun. Judge, 427 P.2d 642, 644 (Nev. 1967); see also Jones v. City of L.A., 444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir.
2006), vacated on other grounds, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007) (preventing Los Angeles from
arresting individuals for sitting, lying, or sleeping in public as a consequence of homelessness
because doing so violates the Eighth Amendment, particularly when there are inadequate
shelters available); Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 350 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (“The
evidence demonstrates that for a number of Dallas homeless at this time homelessness is
involuntary and irremediable . . . . [T]hey must be in public. And it is also clear that they must
sleep. Although sleeping is an act rather than a status, the status of being could clearly not be
criminalized under Robinson.”); Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969),
vacated on other grounds, 401 U.S. 987, 987 (1971) (holding a vagrancy statute unconstitutional
because it was vague, overbroad, and punished mere status); Headley v. Selkowitz, 171 So. 2d
368, 370 (Fla. 1965) (holding Miami’s disorderly conduct statue unconstitutional and expressing
caution in enforcing vagrancy statutes generally); Alegata v. Commonwealth, 231 N.E.2d 201,
207 (Mass. 1967) (explaining that “[i]dleness and poverty should not be treated as a criminal
offence [sic]”). But see Whiting v. Town of Westerly, 942 F.2d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 1991) (upholding a
sleeping in public ordinance against First Amendment and equal protection challenges because
sleeping is not per se a constitutionally protected activity).
35. See Smith, supra note 24, at 304–05 (discussing the “changing legal view of the poor”);
see also Jones, 444 F.3d at 1137 (recognizing that “an individual may become homeless based on
factors both within and beyond his immediate control, especially in consideration of the
composition of the homeless as a group: the mentally ill, addicts, victims of domestic violence,
the unemployed, and the unemployable”).
36. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631, 642 (1969).
37. Id. at 631, 642.
38. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
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plight of the impoverished and readily accept greater constitutional
protections for the poor as part of America’s aligning moral compass.
Congress, however, has been more limited in granting aid to the poor
since the mid-1990s, culminating in the elimination of AFDC and its
replacement with TANF in 1996.
B. From AFDC to TANF and the 1996 Congressional Welfare
Reforms
The modern welfare state can be traced back to the turn of the
twentieth century, when many states supported young widows who
had lost their husbands, often to industrial accidents. States created
special “widows’ pension plans” designed to provide widows with the
means necessary to care for their children so that they would not have
39
to place them in orphanages.
Economic strife and mass
unemployment during the Great Depression generated the political
will to expand these programs at the federal level and, accordingly,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Social Security Act of
1935, establishing federal widows pension benefits, social security,
40
unemployment insurance, and AFDC. In the 1960s, President
Johnson declared a “war on poverty,” expanding previous welfare
programs like AFDC and initiating new programs such as the Federal
Food Stamp program and educational plans like the Elementary and
41
Secondary Education Act of 1965. These initiatives were largely in
response to the increasing awareness of racial inequality in the United
42
States and its contribution to poverty.
By the late 1980s, however, many American taxpayers were
increasingly dissatisfied with the federal welfare system, and Congress
began launching campaigns for reform. Although some of the impetus
for welfare reform likely originated out of a genuine desire to better

39. WELFARE REFORM: SOCIAL IMPACT (Films Media Group 1997).
40. Id.
41. See Dylan P. Grady, Charter School Revocation: A Method for Efficiency,
Accountability, and Success, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 513, 516–17 (2012) (explaining that the purpose of
the Act was to give more resources, like textbooks, to underfunded schools so children in
poverty could receive a better elementary and secondary education).
42. See generally Lyndon B. Johnson, Message to Congress on the Economic Opportunity
Act (1964), reprinted in WELFARE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF U.S. POLICY AND POLITICS,
supra note 4, at 224 (“The young man or woman who grows up without a decent education, in a
broken home, in a hostile environment, in ill health or in the face of racial injustice—that young
man or woman is often trapped in a life of poverty.”).
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incorporate lower-income citizens into the workforce, many people
lamented the number of never-married, single mothers receiving
44
welfare benefits and AFDC checks. Whereas most welfare recipients
in the 1930s were widows with dependent children, by the 1990s,
many individuals receiving AFDC benefits were single mothers who
45
had never married.
The welfare reform debate revived a stark distinction between
46
what some have called the “deserving” and “undeserving” poor.
Many political efforts aimed at limiting or prohibiting federal money
47
from going to teenagers giving birth to children out of wedlock,
48
furthering the stereotype of the “welfare queen” and perpetuating
the notion that some women “deliberately get pregnant and have
49
babies in order to collect welfare and set up their own households.”
Moreover, the growing number of women balancing careers with
childrearing by the late 1980s began fostering the expectation that
50
women on welfare should work.
In this welfare-skeptical environment, Congress passed the
51
Family Support Act of 1988, which established a mandatory federal
52
jobs program and employment training. The most dramatic
reform—the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of

43. Hearings on the Work and Responsibility Act Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means,
103d Cong. (1994) (statements of Donna Shalala), reprinted in WELFARE: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF U.S. POLICY AND POLITICS, supra note 4, at 578–86.
44. PREVIEW OF REPUBLICAN PLANS TO REFORM WELFARE (1994), reprinted in
WELFARE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF U.S. POLICY AND POLITICS, supra note 4, at 590–94.
45. WELFARE REFORM: SOCIAL IMPACT (Films Media Group 1997).
46. See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, America’s Uneasy Relationship With the Working
Poor, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 17, 18 (1999) (describing society’s distinction between the “deserving”
and the “undeserving” poor and how TANF requirements sought to limit benefits to those
viewed as undeserving, including lazy, unmarried mothers who seek public assistance over
work).
47. PREVIEW OF REPUBLICAN PLANS TO REFORM WELFARE, supra note 44, at 592.
48. Gilman, supra note 7, at 259 (highlighting President Reagan’s description of many
single mothers on welfare as “Cadillac driving ‘welfare queens’” who cheat taxpayers out of
their hard-earned money).
49. Issues in Brief: Teenage Pregnancy and the Welfare Reform Debate (Alan Guttmacher
Institute 1995), reprinted in WELFARE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF U.S. POLICY AND
POLITICS, supra note 4, at 624–30, 625.
50. WELFARE REFORM: SOCIAL IMPACT (Films Media Group 1997).
51. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
667).
52. WELFARE REFORM: SOCIAL IMPACT (Films Media Group 1997).
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53

1996 —was passed shortly afterwards and is still in place today.
Under this legislation, TANF replaced AFDC, creating a new federal
54
welfare scheme that eliminated “welfare entitlement.” States are
now required to impose a five-year lifetime limit when federal funds
are used to provide assistance to families, but states can also set more
55
stringent limits on receipt of federal or state TANF benefits. States
are also required to impose work requirements and to sanction
56
individuals who are not working by revoking their benefits. Federal
guidelines require that at least 50 percent of families within a state
work at least thirty hours per week, or twenty hours for families with
a single parent and children, and states can lose federal funding if
57
they do not comply with this baseline. Generally, states cannot use
federal funds to give additional benefits to women who give birth to
children while receiving welfare benefits, capping the assistance
provided based upon the number of children a single mother had
58
prior to receiving TANF. Furthermore, states under the new
legislation maintain substantial discretion to impose additional work
or community service requirements, or time limits; or to require the
use of TANF funds for childcare, job training, or similar services
without providing direct cash assistance to families as they did under
59
AFDC.
60
While the stated goals of TANF may be reasonable, many
believe Congress intended the strict time limits and work
requirements to punish the poor and decrease America’s
61
responsibility for society’s neediest individuals and families, many of

53. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-93, 110
Stat. 2105 (codified in scattered sections of 7, 8, 20, 25 and 42 U.S.C.).
54. Under the new program, the federal government gives block grants to the states to be
given to welfare recipients until funding evaporates for that fiscal year. RUTH SIDEL, KEEPING
WOMEN AND CHILDREN LAST: AMERICA’S WAR ON THE POOR 105 (1998).
55. Liz Schott, Policy Basics: An Introduction to TANF, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES (Dec. 4, 2012), available at http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=936.
56. Most of these sanctions are considered “‘full-family’ sanctions,” meaning that an entire
family loses their benefits as a result of one adult member’s lack of employment. Id.
57. Id.
58. SIDEL, supra note 54, at 105.
59. Schott, supra note 55.
60. TANF’s stated goals are to provide assistance to needy families, promote work and
marriage, decrease dependency and out-of-wedlock pregnancies, and encourage two-parent
households. Id.
61. See SIDEL, supra note 54, at 109 (“In reality, the current wave of legislation is a way of
punishing the poor for being poor, punishing mothers who are single—whether through
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whom were branded as “undeserving” of taxpayer-funded cash
62
assistance. Given that TANF has not been particularly successful in
meeting its goals, but has instead eliminated a significant safety net
63
for low-income households, TANF certainly seems to have done
64
more to alienate and penalize the poor for their status than it has to
provide them with vital assistance.
II. PENALIZING THE POOR: HOW WELFARE RESTRICTIONS CAN BE
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
This Section explores welfare reform in greater depth and
explains how current restrictions could conflict with the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment,
especially when viewed in the light of contemporary standards of
human decency. As certain reforms penalize individuals who are
unemployed and place time limits on relief, these restrictions often
surpass legitimate and constitutional guidelines for welfare. While not
all limits on welfare are unconstitutional, some of the current rules
may unconstitutionally penalize the mere status of being poor.
A. Poverty and Unemployment as a Status
Two dichotomous views of the poor constantly collide in
American legal and social discourse and influence whether one
perceives poverty as a consequence of free choices or more of an
involuntary status like homelessness or drug addiction. The first
deeply ingrained American model, originating in the Elizabethan
Poor Laws in the 1600s, supports assisting the poor, but largely
65
blames them for their own plight. Although English society aided its
most destitute by providing shelter through “places of habitation,”
the Elizabethan Poor Laws required all able-bodied males, single

separation, divorce, death, or having children outside of marriage—for being single, and
punishing those people who make us question the plausibility of the American Dream.”).
62. See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.
63. See Danilo Trisi and LaDonna Pavetti, TANF Weakening as a Safety Net for Poor
Families, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (Mar. 13, 2012), available at
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=3700 (showing that, on average, AFDC lifted
62 percent of families out of deep poverty whereas TANF has only lifted 21 percent of families
out of deep poverty).
64. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
65. Larry Cata Backer, Medieval Poor Law in Twentieth Century America: Looking Back
Towards a General Theory of Modern American Poor Relief, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 871, 953
(1995).
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females, and children to work a full twelve-hour day. Able-bodied
individuals who failed to work were often placed in “houses of
correction” and “[r]ogues, vagabonds, and vagrants were to be
67
punished.” Under the common notions of the day, paupers were
usually poor on account of their idle tendencies and this “failure to
[work] was evidence of a social deviance significant enough to merit
68
the attention of the civil and criminal law.”
The belief that many unemployed, able-bodied individuals are
not only undeserving of public assistance but also are lazy, morally
69
deficient, or repudiating the “Protestant Work Ethic” —save a few
carefully prescribed categories of individuals like widows and the
temporarily unemployed—captures an important poverty paradigm in
America. While debating the new TANF programs and requirements
in the 1990s, several Congressional representatives and Senators
spoke of welfare recipients with disdain and indecency, referring to
some as “mules” or “wolves,” and with one Congressman even
70
displaying a sign: “Don’t feed the alligators.” While an extreme
example, these degrading insinuations reflect a common sentiment in
American society that the impoverished, particularly the nonworking
71
poor, are at fault for their poverty whether due to “laziness [and]
72
lack of motivation” or moral depravity deriving from alcoholism,
73
crime, promiscuity, or having children out of wedlock. Under this
model, welfare is a generous gift from society’s honorable taxpayers
74
and, as such, can easily be taken away at any time. On such a view,
work requirements and time limits would be both appropriate and
proportional. Such requirements would not punish welfare recipients
for their status, but would prod the poorest members of society into
joining the workforce and earning their own living. On this view,

66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 955 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 959.
JOHN E. TROPMAN, DOES AMERICA HATE THE POOR? THE OTHER AMERICAN
DILEMMA 19 (1998).
70. Gilman, supra note 7, at 262 (internal quotation marks omitted).
71. TROPMAN, supra note 69, at 33–34.
72. Id. at 34.
73. PREVIEW OF REPUBLICAN PLANS TO REFORM WELFARE, supra note 44, at 591.
74. Assuming, arguendo, that welfare could be taken away in its entirety, there are still
constitutional limits on how it can be revoked once in place. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 270 (1970) (holding that procedural due process requires a pre-termination hearing
before revocation of welfare benefits can begin).
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those who shy away from this laudable path should have to live with
the consequences.
In contrast to this model, another conception of destitution exists
in America that acknowledges the involuntariness of poverty and the
factors outside one’s control that can affect an individual’s income.
According to a 2014 CNBC survey, a majority of Americans now
believe that poverty is generally the result of circumstances beyond
75
one’s control rather than a lack of drive or moral fiber. Factors
76
lack of adequate educational
including gender and race,
77
opportunities, growing up in an unsanitary or crime-ridden
78
79
environment, “the place or family” into which one is born, one’s
80
mental and physical health, and other circumstances can prevent
economic advancement, regardless of aspirations. According to this
paradigm, many welfare recipients are “caring mother[s]” or
“hardworking student[s],” even if they have struggled with drug
81
addiction, out-of-wedlock pregnancies, or unemployment. For many
Americans on welfare, they have “no hope, no other place to go, no
other way to care for their children” and welfare provides an essential
82
source of income that the recipients cannot supply on their own.
This model is less hospitable to rigid work requirements,
responsibility forms, and time limits because it acknowledges that an
individual’s status in poverty may be involuntary.
As early as 1941, the Supreme Court recognized that “the
Elizabethan [P]oor [L]aws no longer fit[] the facts” because “a person
[] without employment and without funds [does not] constitute[] a
moral pestilence . . . [as] [p]overty and morality are not

75. Steve Liesman, Being Poor Not a Person’s Fault: CNBC Survey, CNBC (Mar. 26, 2014),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/101524336.
76. TROPMAN, supra note 69, at 27.
77. See JONATHAN KOZOL, Chapter 1: Life on the Mississippi: East St. Louis, Illinois, in
SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 7–39 (1991) (describing the dearth
of school resources and the lack of safe, clean educational facilities in East St. Louis, Illinois
public schools).
78. Id. at 10–13.
79. Liesman, supra note 75.
80. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (explaining that courts have come to realize
that factors such as mental illness and domestic violence are more to blame for poverty and
homelessness than one’s moral makeup).
81. SIDEL, supra note 54, at 81–84.
82. Id. at 85.
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83

synonymous.” Courts’ frequent invalidations of many of the
ordinances banning sleeping in public, vagrancy, and loitering rest
upon the theory that homelessness and poverty are not normally
chosen conditions, but are circumstances that affect people in difficult
84
financial straits. Although state and federal courts often stop short
85
of fully embracing a constitutional “right to shelter,” judges
frequently recognize the involuntariness of unemployment and
homelessness and the way in which factors outside one’s control
contribute to these phenomena.
Therefore, viewing poverty and unemployment as more
analogous to an involuntary status rather than a choice is appropriate
86
in many situations and echoes the legal doctrine in this realm.
American children offer a prime example because they lack free
choice over their circumstances and live in poverty in high numbers.
According to the U.S. Census Bureau statistics from 2012, 25.1
percent of children under five live in poverty and 9.7 percent live in
“extreme poverty,” or on a family income that is less than half of the
87
poverty line. This income disparity disproportionately impacts
88
children of color, particularly African-Americans and Hispanics.
TANF sanctions usually revoke benefits from an entire family when
one adult member is failing to meet his or her work obligations,
regardless of the impact these sanctions will have on the family’s
89
children. As such, the mandated penalties in the federal guidelines
are constitutionally suspect as they often force states to indirectly
punish children through parental or family sanctions.

83. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 174–77 (1941) (quotation marks omitted); see also
Smith, supra note24, at 304–05 (describing the “changing legal view of the poor”).
84. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
85. See Jonathan L. Hafetz, Homeless Legal Advocacy, New Challenges and Directions for
the Future, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1215, 1231–34 (2003) (describing a few 1980s court decisions
that recognized a right to shelter, but showing how more recent cases have lessened or
eliminated this right).
86. This is not to say that these conditions could never be the products of free choice, but a
recognition of the fact that they rarely are.
87. Valerie Strauss, New Census Data: Children Remain America’s Poorest Citizens, THE
WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answersheet/wp/2013/09/17/new-census-data-children-remain-americas-poorest-citizens.
88. Id.
89. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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B. Welfare Reform as “Cruel and Unusual” Punishment
Assuming that poverty and unemployment are analogous to the
aforementioned involuntary statuses of homelessness and drug
90
addition, revoking welfare benefits from individuals and their
families for losing their jobs, being fired, or being unable to maintain
stable employment due to personal difficulties can be
91
disproportionate and cruel. Many scholars and advocates agree that
the 1996 Congress intentionally sought to punish certain sectors of
poor Americans—those perceived as “hoarding” taxpayer dollars—
through this legislation. Wendell Primus, a former secretary at the
Department of Health and Human Services under the Clinton
Administration, resigned after President Clinton signed the 1996 Act
because the “bill turned very punitive,” especially by limiting or
denying federal funds to unwed minor mothers, instituting family
caps, and limiting federal funds to families, all while the brunt of
92
these new, restrictive policies would fall upon needy children.
What makes these restrictions potentially cruel and unusual is
not only their inability to lift families out of poverty, but also their
ironic tendency to disincentivize work, render the impoverished more
93
destitute, and reverse AFDC progress. Many welfare recipients are
severely restricted in their ability to find work or stay employed,
facing such obstacles as “lack of education, mental or physical
disabilities, substance abuse or alcoholism, limited work experience,
94
and caregiving responsibilities for disabled children,” only a few of
which are considered valid excuses for unemployment in most states
95
under TANF. Unforeseen life circumstances that reduce work

90. This is not to say that idleness or criminality could not contribute to poverty or cause
impoverishment for some segments of the population, but rather to say that the newer poverty
paradigm holds that these are not sufficient explanations of poverty for a large majority of
lower-income citizens.
91. Other provisions of the 1996 bill seem to be aimed at punishing the impoverished for
their status as “poor,” “unemployed,” or “welfare recipients” based on outdated, Elizabethan
notions that the nonworking impoverished should suffer the consequences of their choices.
These provisions include lifetime caps, limiting money to single mothers, revoking benefits for
legal immigrants, and restricting food stamps and social security income on the whole.
WELFARE REFORM: SOCIAL IMPACT (Films Media Group 1997).
92. Id.
93. Gilman, supra note 7, at 271.
94. Id. at 270.
95. See, e.g., Pam Silberman, North Carolina Programs Serving Young Children and their
Families, N.C. INST. OF MED. 13 (1999) (explaining that the exemptions from work
requirements in North Carolina are only applicable to single parents with children under one
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potential can result in severe sanctions, such as partial loss of already
96
meager benefits or even permanent revocation of benefits —an
unmistakable irony given that welfare’s purpose is to foster a “safety
97
net” for struggling Americans. Although some states label caring for
sick children as “community service” in order to satisfy the work
98
requirement, other states are not as generous. Even if a state grants
partial or complete community service credit to recipients caring for a
sick relative, welfare generally has a five-year maximum lifetime
99
limit. Given the rise of extreme poverty in the United States and the
100
lack of eligible, needy families receiving benefits post-TANF, the
program has arguably increased poverty rather than reduced it.
Meanwhile, several Supreme Court and lower federal court
decisions have recognized that depriving prisoners of vital necessities,
101
such as shelter, food, or exercise, violates the Eighth Amendment.
102
In 2000, in Johnson v. Lewis, the Ninth Circuit declared that prison
guards have an affirmative obligation to provide prisoners with life’s
necessities, including food, water, and medical care, in compliance
103
with the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, although the Eighth
Amendment traditionally only applied to punishment for “crimes,”
the prison deprivation cases show that sanctions and maltreatment
year of age, un-emancipated minors, and adults with children under six years of age where
adequate childcare cannot be found, whereas all other adults are deemed “mandatory work
families”).
96. Yoanna X. Moisides, I Just Need Help . . . TANF, the Deficit Reduction Act, and the
New “Work Eligible” Individual, 11 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 17, 25 (2007).
97. See KATZ, supra note 1, at 285 (referring to the safety net as a “rhetorical illusion”).
98. See Moisides, supra note 96, at 29–30 (describing the situation of a Maryland woman,
Hope, who fought in court to reinstate her benefits after the welfare office sought to close her
case for being late to work or missing work while she was taking care of her ill son who suffered
from asthma, diabetes, and respiratory infections).
99. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
100. See Peter Edelman, Welfare Reform and Extreme Poverty: What to Do?, 42
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 349, 350 (2008) (demonstrating that prior to welfare reform, the
majority of children in extreme poverty benefitted from some cash assistance, whereas in 2006,
less than one-third of families in extreme poverty were receiving TANF).
101. Bukowski, supra note 19, at 434; see Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)
(while holding that putting two prisoners in the same cell is not per se cruel and unusual
punishment, “deprivation[] of basic human needs” or medical care can be unconstitutional).
102. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 2000)
103. Id. at 731. Although the routine discomfort inherent in the prison setting is inadequate
to satisfy the objective prong of an Eighth Amendment inquiry, “those deprivations denying the
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an
Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347) (internal citations
omitted). Prison officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate shelter,
food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Id.
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can also rise to the level of “cruel and unusual punishment” if they
are akin to “a fine, penalty, or confinement inflicted upon a person by
104
the authority of the law.” When comparing prison deprivation cases
to welfare recipient sanctions, punishing individuals for
unemployment in the context of welfare reform seems to violate the
Eighth Amendment—especially when sanctions directly result in a
similar denial of necessities. Critics of this view would argue that
welfare sanctions are different from prison deprivation cases because
welfare is more akin to charity and because welfare recipients are free
to provide for their own needs in ways that prisoners cannot.
There are grounded reasons, however, to more scrupulously
compare the life situations of welfare recipients with that of prisoner
confinement before dismissing the Eighth Amendment welfare claim.
Extensive poverty research shows that most welfare recipients are
plainly “trapped in the cycle of poverty”—the vast majority do not
own cars, some lack simple furniture or even a bed on which to sleep,
105
and most cannot procure vital necessities without welfare benefits.
Moreover, data shows that the number of families in extreme poverty
106
continues to rise and that TANF can be blamed for an additional
800,000 children in extreme poverty since 1995, children who would
107
have been significantly better off under AFDC. Based on Justice
Brennan’s “human dignity” metrics for cruel and unusual
108
punishment
and the reciprocal notion that prisoners are
constitutionally entitled to life necessities, punitive welfare sanctions
based on employment status or work capacity could equally violate
the Eighth Amendment.
If this understanding of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and
TANF sanctions gained traction in the courts or Congress, it would
have profound implications for America’s welfare system and how
work requirements operate. Not all work or community service
requirements would necessarily be prohibited under the Eighth
104. Bukowski, supra note 19, at 419–20, 429.
105. Creola Johnson, Welfare Reform and Asset Accumulation: First We Need a Bed and a
Car, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 1221, 1224–25, 1279 (2000).
106. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
107. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-164, TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR
NEEDY FAMILIES: FEWER ELIGIBLE FAMILIES HAVE RECEIVED CASH ASSISTANCE SINCE THE
1990S, AND THE RECESSION’S IMPACT ON CASELOADS VARIES BY STATE 35 (2010).
108. See Smith, supra note 24, at 313–14 (quoting Justice Brennan’s “human dignity
rationale” in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 272–73 (1972): “the true significance of these
punishments is that they treat members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed
with and discarded” (internal quotations omitted)).
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Amendment, only highly punitive ones that seek to punish
impoverished Americans for their status in poverty and deny
recipients life-sustaining resources. Especially problematic would be
work requirements for those who face life circumstances rendering it
109
difficult if not impossible for them to work, and sanctions that
deprive welfare recipients of vital resources, like food, water, and
110
medical care. Sanctions that punish impoverished children for their
parents’ “misdeeds” are particularly suspect, as are restrictions that
terminate benefits for truly needy persons without just cause.
C. Constitutional Challenges: Positive v. Negative Rights
One glaring criticism of labeling welfare sanctions
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment centers upon the
traditional distinction between positive and negative rights. Under
traditional interpretations, the Constitution only protects its citizens
from government intrusion, but it does not establish any “positive”
rights or require the government to follow any particular course of
111
action to ensure that rights are recognized. Thus, if welfare benefits
are positive, statutory rights that are not per se constitutionally
required, then revoking them cannot give rise to constitutional
challenges because the Constitution only protects negative, not
positive rights.
There are two significant problems with this theory, however.
First, the dichotomy between positive and negative rights has begun
to crumble as many legal scholars have recognized that courts must
enforce negative rights with positive rights; thus, scholars have argued
112
that this deeply ingrained legal distinction is actually quite flawed.
A prisoner, for example, cannot be free from cruel and unusual

109. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
111. STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COSTS OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY
DEPENDS ON TAXES 40 (2000) (explaining the deeply held American dichotomy between
positive and negative rights and providing that “[n]egative rights typically protect liberty;
positive rights typically promote equality”).
112. See id. at 43 (explaining that “all legally enforced rights are . . . positive rights” or
alternatively, “almost every right implies a correlative duty, and duties are taken seriously only
when dereliction is punished by the public power drawing on the public purse”). But see Frank
B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 866–67, 915–24 (2001) (suggesting
a framework for distinguishing between positive and negative rights based on whether the right
would affirmatively exist without any government at all and, subsequently, arguing that judges
are not likely to give the poor a right to necessities because this is a role for the legislature, not
the courts).
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punishment unless prison staff members provide him or her with basic
necessities. Likewise, a welfare recipient cannot be free from cruel
and unusual welfare sanctions without receiving adequate benefits for
his or her survival. Second, even if one accepts the traditional
distinction between negative and positive rights and the premise that
welfare is only a statutory right, revocable at Congress’s whim, the
Supreme Court has still recognized constitutional limits on how
welfare can be provided, revoked, and reinstated. Neither Congress
nor the states can deny welfare benefits in a way that violates an
113
114
individual’s freedom of association or freedom to travel, and
115
welfare cannot be denied without a full and fair hearing. Likewise,
welfare cannot be instituted or revoked in a way that violates the
Eighth Amendment.
III. A CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPLIANT WELFARE SCHEME
There are a plethora of ways in which Congress could alter and
revitalize the current welfare system to reflect evolving “standards of
116
[human] decency.” Since Eighth Amendment doctrine reflects
normative judgments about society’s current standards of decency,
there is ample room for policy analysis within the jurisprudential
framework. There are several viable alternatives to the current
regime that would provide immediate relief to families and restore
the safety net concept, both of which are essential to maintaining a
healthy balance between personal responsibility and decency.
Although encouraging able-bodied, healthy individuals and their
families to become self-sufficient is a reasonable legislative goal,
Congress should avoid withdrawing life-sustaining resources from
citizens who depend on welfare for their survival.
117
At a minimum, “full-family sanctions” should be eliminated
and children in lower-income households should be independently
entitled to welfare payments separate and apart from their parents to
113. See United States Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 529 (1973) (holding that
welfare agencies cannot deny eligible food stamp recipients for living with “unrelated persons”
because this violates one’s right to association).
114. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641–42 (1969) (holding that welfare restrictions
cannot inhibit one’s constitutional right to travel).
115. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264–265 (1970) (requiring an evidentiary hearing
before terminating a recipient’s welfare benefits).
116. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, supra note 17, at 638 (internal quotations
omitted).
117. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text (internal quotations omitted).
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avoid punishing children for their parents’ work histories. Although
these checks could be sent to parents for the benefit of their children,
118
they could also be given to individuals like Guardians Ad Litem,
who would ensure that children get access to the benefits, especially
in situations in which parents are suspected of misappropriating the
funds. Another improvement would be to eliminate the “one-size-fits119
all” benefits plan in favor of a case-by-case approach. Under this
model, states would still need to provide a minimum level of benefits
120
to needy families, preferably without time limits or lifetime caps.
121
While excessive state discretion could lead to abuse, a case-by-case
approach may be useful in many circumstances—particularly in
helping certain individuals to find jobs and in helping others to
122
receive alcohol or drug treatment.
Although the current work requirements deeply impact poor
families—often negatively—welfare should strive to lead recipients to
stable employment and self-sufficiency when possible. Converting this
system from its existing sanctions-based approach to an incentivedriven scheme would likely lead to better results in improving the
employment situations of welfare recipients and in eliminating
poverty. Eligible individuals could receive minimum benefits to cover
necessary expenses—such as shelter, nutritious food, and clothing—as
well as additional benefits or “bonuses” for maintaining steady
employment, participating in community service, elevating their job
skills, or searching for work. These additional benefits could be held
in trust for recipients until they become self-sufficient. These
examples are certainly not exhaustive, but they provide a starting
point for making welfare reform an adequate safety net that is
compliant with the Eighth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
The proliferation of hunger, malnutrition, unsanitary living
conditions, inadequate heat and shelter, and denial of medical care in

118. Guardian ad litem programs have been successful in child abuse and custody cases, as
these guardians represent a specific child’s interests in court. See generally Mary Kay Kisthardt,
Working in the Best Interests of Children: Facilitating the Collaboration of Lawyers and Social
Workers in Abuse and Neglect Cases, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (2006) (discussing this point).
119. Gilman, supra note 7, at 277–78.
120. Edelman, supra note 100, at 354.
121. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
122. Id.
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contemporary American society represents a failure of welfare
reform to adequately uplift society’s neediest members. Sanctions
placed upon unemployed TANF beneficiaries, limiting their ability to
obtain vital resources, can hinder recipients’ advancement into the
workforce and place many needy individuals, including children, in
unsafe or unsanitary living conditions. The Eighth Amendment,
however, has historically ensured that another population in need—
individuals in prison—has a constitutional right to adequate food,
clothing, and shelter. Reconciling the distinction in treatment
between these paradigms requires distinguishing between legitimate
means of administering welfare to the poor, and the punitive,
retaliatory measures that deprive them of life-sustaining resources in
violation of the Constitution.

